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We study perfect information bilateral bargaining game with an inﬁnite
alternating-oﬀers procedure, in which we add an assumption of history de-
pendent preference. A player will devalue a share which gives her strictly
lower discounted utility than what she was oﬀered in earlier stages of the
bargaining, namely, a “worse oﬀ” outcome. In a strong version of the
assumption, each player prefers impasse to any “worse oﬀ” outcome. We
characterize the essentially unique subgame perfect equilibrium path under
the assumption. The equilibrium entails considerable delay and eﬃciency
loss. As the players become inﬁnitely patient, the eﬃciency loss goes to one
half, and the equilibrium share goes to Nash solution. The assumption can
also be weakened. We provide a suﬃcient condition on the extent of deval-
uation under which the feature of the equilibrium from strong assumption
remains.
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11 Introduction
Rubinstein (1982) analyzed a bargaining model with an inﬁnite alternating-oﬀers
procedure, and established uniqueness of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
when both parties’ time preferences are represented by exponential discount-
ing. He also showed that agreement is immediately reached. This contradicts
our daily observation that bargaining almost always takes some time, and rarely
appears to be eﬃcient. Delays and even impasses are common in real bargaining.
Much theoretic work has been done to account for this, and most of it relies
on incomplete information as the driving force behind delays, i.e., the players
have incomplete information about the “fundamentals” of the bargaining, such
as the other party’s patience, outside option, etc.. Under incomplete informa-
tion settings, there are always multiple equilibria, and reﬁnement criteria for the
equilibria becomes a major issue.
In this paper, we take a diﬀerent approach to study delay in bargaining. We
assume that players have history dependent preferences, that is, players’ payoﬀs
not only depend on the outcome of the bargaining, but also depend on the speciﬁc
bargaining process leading to the outcome. What they get from a ﬁnal agreement,
together with what they have been oﬀered and rejected determine their current
payoﬀ, which is then discounted due to impatience.
In our model, players still have intrinsic preferences over the outcome. As
usual, this preference admits a separable representation, i.e., a concave utility
function measuring current value of a share and a time-discounting term. This
representation allows us to introduce a strong version of history dependent pref-
erence. We shall assume each player prefers impasse to any outcome, which is
worse, in terms of discounted utility, than any oﬀer she has rejected; and her
preference over improving outcome is always measured by the intrinsic utility
function. This preference is assumed to be common knowledge between the play-
ers. With such preferences, the players will strategically hold back in making
oﬀers, because once an oﬀer is rejected the proposer has to keep improving it in
order to reach agreement. Yet players are impatient, so they have a countervail-
ing incentive to reach an early agreement. These two counteracting forces induce
some interesting results. We still have essentially unique SPE, but it involves con-
siderable delay. The equilibrium has a ﬂavor of reciprocity, that is, the players
will start from two extreme positions, each player will make some small conces-
sion at the beginning, after the opponent makes reciprocal responses, the step of
the concession will increase, and they ﬁn a l l yr e a c ha na g r e e m e n ts o m e w h e r ei n
2the middle. Equilibrium play thus exhibits realistic features.
A weaker version of history dependent preference will also be studied. Be-
fore we proceed, we provide two diﬀerent interpretations of the history dependent
preferences, delegated bargaining with justiﬁcation and reference dependent pref-
erence.
Many real life bargaining situations are delegated bargaining, for instance,
political bargaining. In such kind of situations, the agent usually has to justify
her performance ex post. For the agent, the most important thing is to convince
her principal that her performance was successful, and she has done the best given
the situation. Based on this, the agent also cares about the material outcome.
Basically, the justiﬁcation is combined with a contract between the principal and
the agent. The contract is monotone, i.e., the better is the discounted utility of
the principal from the outcome of the bargaining, the better is the payment to
the agent. The monotone contract prevents the agent from simply taking the
ﬁrst oﬀer. About the justiﬁcation, we think it is natural to consider a criterion
involving following rule: a performance is considered to be unsuccessful if the
agent has forgone an oﬀe ra n de n d su pw i t haw o r s eo ﬀer in terms of discounted
utility for the principal. Intuitively, the principal’s logic is: the agent did not do
a satisfactory job because she had chance(s) to get a better result, but did not
take it. The justiﬁcation requirement gives the agent a commitment advantage,
which induces delay.
We borrow the concept of Justiﬁability from Spiegler (2002), but apply the
idea in a diﬀerent way. In his model, the agent, who plays the game, has to
be able to justify her strategy choice based on a plausible conjecture of the op-
ponent’s strategy in an ex post debate-like justiﬁcation procedure between the
agent and the principal. Being justiﬁable means that for any potential criticism
on the agent’s strategy, there is a counter-argument based on the same logic.
Spiegler applied a simplicity-based criterion on plausibility, and obtained inter-
esting outcomes for a number of ﬁnite horizon games with paradoxical SPEs, such
as chain-store game and centipede game.
We can also interpret the assumed preferen c ea sp r e f e r e n c ew i t hl o s sa v e r s i o n
as deﬁn e di nT v e r s k ya n dK a h n e m a n( 1 9 9 1 ) .E a c hp l a y e rt a k e st h eb e s te v e ro ﬀer
in terms of discounted utility as her reference point. A share providing higher
discounted utility will be valued as before, but a share with lower discounted
utility, namely a loss, will be devalued. Our strong assumption corresponds to
an extreme case of devaluation of the shares in the region of loss, any such share
brings a negative payoﬀ t ot h ep l a y e r . T h em a g n i t u d eo ft h i sn e g a t i v ep a y o ﬀ
3does not matter, the player simply prefer impasse to any loss. In other words,
the players here are assumed to be extremely loss averse.
O n en o t a b l ef e a t u r eh e r ei st h a tt h er e f e r e n c ep o i n te v o l v e se n d o g e n o u s l y .A n
improving oﬀe rf r o mo n es i d ec h a n g et h er e f e r e n c ep o i n to ft h eo t h e rs i d ei nt h e
future play, and without the improving oﬀer, the reference point changes over
time due to the discounting. There is a similar formation of reference level in
Barberis, et al. (2001). In their model, investor gets utility from ﬂuctuations of
risky asset, and they take the reference level to be the current value of the asset
scaled up by the risk-free interest rate.
Under this interpretation, it is natural to weaken the strong assumption. We
can replace the discontinuity at the reference point by a kink. In the case of
linear utility, what we do is simply to give the utility function a larger slope rate
in the loss region. In section 4, we will show that when the kink is sharp enough,
or, the loss aversion eﬀe c ti sl a r g ee n o u g h ,w ec a ng e ts i m i l a ru n i q u eS P Ep a t h
with considerable delay. Thus, the discontinuity in the strong assumption is not
necessary to obtain delay.
1.1 Related Literature
Experiments in game theory have been providing results inconsistent with game
theoretic predictions. It has been argued that human subjects do not behave
according to these predictions in many situations, and an alternative view is that
the preferences of the human subjects are not always determined by the material
outcome of the game. When two diﬀerent plays bring the same material outcome
for a player, she may prefer one play over the other. Weibull (2004) introduced
a notion of “game protocol”, and analyzed context-dependent preference and
interpersonal preference dependence. Our preference assumption is in favor of
the latter view mentioned above. It can be viewed as a special form of context-
dependent preference.
Abreu and Gul (2000) introduced a small fraction of behavioral type into their
bargaining model and studied two-sided reputation formation in bargaining. The
behavioral bias they used was that the players might commit to a ﬁxed share and
only accept that amount or higher1. There is a unique sequential equilibrium
in their model, and it entails delay, consequently eﬃciency loss. The type of
each player is not revealed before the bargaining, and the eﬃciency loss in their
1T h eb e h a v i o r a lt y p ew i t ho b s t i n a t ed e m a n dw a sﬁrst introduced into a bargaining model
with one-sided reputation formation in Myerson (1991).
4model is eﬀectively information-induced. The behavioral bias can be interpreted
as being caused by an aberration of preference.
Some work has been done to explain the strategic delay in bargaining with
complete information models. Ma and Manove (1993) studied a bargaining game
with deadline and imperfect control over the timing of oﬀers. They obtained a
symmetric Markov-Perfect Equilibrium involving delay and positive probability
of impasse. Perry and Reny (1993) and Sakovics (1993) considered continuous
time case, simultaneous oﬀer is the necessary condition to get delay in their mod-
els. More closely related, Fershtman and Seidman (1993) combined “endogenous
commitment” assumption and “deadline eﬀect” in their model. When players
are suﬃciently patient, there is unique and ineﬃcient SPE, in which the agree-
ment is delayed until the last period, and no concessions are made before that.
A fair lottery determines one player who gets the whole pie in the last period.
The endogenous commitment assumption, a player cannot accept any oﬀer lower
than what she has rejected, is similar to our assumption of history dependent
preference. The key diﬀerence is that we scale up the commitment levels by the
discount factors. More importantly, the “endogenous commitment” assumption
in their model itself cannot induce delay without “deadline eﬀect”.
In our model, rejection of an oﬀer from the opponent can also be view as a
commitment tactic. There are other theoretic models concerning the strategic
commitment, for example, Crawford (1982) and Muthoo (1996). The commit-
ment in our model is diﬀerent from theirs. They both assumed that once a player
makes a demand for a speciﬁc share of the pie, she will have to pay a retreat
cost if she settles with a share lower than her original demand. Crawford (1982)
explained impasses in real bargaining based on this possibility of commitment,
and Muthoo (1996) studied how the retreat cost functions aﬀect the equilibrium
share. In our model, the commitment comes from the rejection of oﬀers. An oﬀer
to the opponent also means a demand from the proposer, thus, the key diﬀerence
here is where the commitment power comes from. If we consider the behavior of
committing as a kind of reputation concern, the question will be which one hurts
the reputation more, retreat or regret? From our point of view, there is no yes
or no answer for this question, they are just diﬀerent perspectives to understand
real life bargaining. Diﬀerent commitment tactics work in diﬀerent situations.
Another closely related paper is Admati and Perry (1991). Our model and
some of the main results under the strong assumption share features with their
contribution game. Both models have essentially unique SPE path and consid-
erable delay in the equilibrium. The way we characterize the equilibrium is also
5similar to theirs. One important diﬀerence between the two models is about the
ineﬃciency. In their model, the ineﬃciency is in the sense that the socially de-
sirable project may not be completed. The delay is not the major concern of
their model. Actually, given the convex investment cost functions, the delay is to
some extent socially desirable. In our model, we discuss the ineﬃciency only in
the sense of strategic delay as most of the bargaining literature does. Moreover,
we also consider a more general setting, in which the players may have diﬀerent
concave utility functions and diﬀerent discount factors.
More recently, Compte and Jehiel (2003) studied bargaining and contribution
games under the assumption of history dependent outside options. The ideas of
their paper and the current paper are similar, both explain not only the delay,
but also the important feature of gradualism in real bargaining.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we lay out the
model. We obtain the main results under the strong version of history dependent
preference in section 3. Results under the weaker version of history dependent
preference is presented in section 4. Section 5 includes an informal discussion,
in which we explore, without the assumption of history dependent preferences,
the possibility of providing epistemic foundation for the equilibrium play we have
obtained. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
We analyze a perfect information bargaining game. Two players bargain over
a pie with size 1, the bargaining takes the inﬁnite alternating-oﬀers procedure
introduced by Rubinstein (1982). Each player in turn makes an oﬀer to her
opponent, who decides to accept or reject. The bargaining ends if one player
accepts an oﬀer from the other player. If no one ever accepts an oﬀe r ,i ti sa n
impasse. An oﬀer is deﬁned as the nominal share the proposer agrees to give to
her opponent, and the proposer gets whatever is left.
We call any play path a history. Every history leads to either a terminal node
or a decision node, and a decision node starts a subgame. A startegy speciﬁes an
action at every decision node of a player. We call the part of the strategy in a
subgame as subgame strategy.
Initially, players have intrinsic utility functions u(·) and υ(·) deﬁned on [0,1],
u(·) and υ(·) are strictly increasing and concave, and we also normalize u(0) =
υ (0) = 0, u(1) = υ (1) = 1. The utility function speciﬁe st h ec u r r e n tv a l u eo f
6a share for the player. It is how the players value the share of the pie before




2 : u−1(α)+υ−1(β) ≤ 1
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.
An agreement can be reached at t =0 ,1,2,.... The players are impatient,
and the nominal utility from the share of the pie will be discounted over periods
by 0 < δ1,δ2 < 1, i.e., the discounted utility for player 1 (resp. player 2) from a




2υ(y)). As usual, the
(discounted) utility from an impasse is simply zero. The key diﬀerence we have
in the current model is that the payoﬀ to the players will be history dependent.
Basically, we do not always take the discounted utility from the share of the pie
as the payoﬀ of a player.
We assume that if a player ends up with a share which gives her the highest
discounted utility from whatever she has been oﬀered, her payoﬀ is just the
discounted utility from that share. But if the player ends up with a share strictly
worse in terms of discounted utility than any oﬀer she rejected along the history
path, i.e., a “worse oﬀ” outcome or an unsuccessful bargaining performance, her
payoﬀ will be negative. The payoﬀ from impasse is zero. Therefore, impasse
is strictly preferred to any “worse oﬀ”o u t c o m e . W ec a na l s op u ti tt h i sw a y ,
the players have lexicographic preferences over the outcomes of the bargaining,
in which a 0/1 indicator of being successful or not is the ﬁrst argument, the
discounted utility is the second argument, and the ﬁrst one has the higher priority.
We think it makes sense in many political bargaining situations. Under such
setting, it is obvious that in a possible subgame perfect equilibrium, each player
will never accept an oﬀer which gives her lower discounted utility than what
she was oﬀered before. This is what we call the Strong Assumption of History
Dependent Preference. Before we formally state the assumption, we need one
more notation, the state variables for the bargaining game.
Deﬁnition State variable xt (resp. yt) at tth period of the bargaining game
is the smallest share player 1 (resp. player 2) needs to keep her discounted utility
not lower than what she could get from any previous oﬀer.
We denote by ci
s the oﬀer made by player i in sth period, then
xt =m a x (s<t){u−1[u(c2
s)/δ
t−s
1 ]},f o ra n yo d dn u m b e rs<t ;






},f o ra n ye v e nn u m b e rs<t ;
and x0 = y0 =0 .
In our model, all relevant information in a speciﬁc history is included in the
state variables. We can denote a subgame starting with a decision node for one
7of the players to make an oﬀer as (xt,y t)i, the subscript i ∈ {1,2} refers to the
player who makes the ﬁrst oﬀer in the subgame.
Now we can give the Strong Assumption of History Dependent Preference
formally as following.
Strong Assumption of History Dependent Preference
At tth period of the bargaining game, the (current) utility functions from the
share of the pie are:




if x ≥ xt,
if x < xt;




if y ≥ yt,
if y < yt.
What we do here is to truncate the utility functions, u(·) and v(·), according
to the state variables every period. This is equivalent to putting a dynamic
restriction on the feasible set of actions. It can be either one of the following two
alternatives.
1. A player is not allowed to accept any oﬀer which is worse (for
herself) than what she has rejected along the history path in terms of
discounted utility.
2. A player is not allowed to make any oﬀer which is worse (for
her opponent) than what she has oﬀered and been rejected along the
history path in terms of discounted utility.
I ti so b v i o u st h a tt h i sd i ﬀerent way to make the assumption has no eﬀect on
t h eS P Ep a t h .W ew o u l dl i k et om a k et h ea s s u m p t i o no nt h ep r e f e r e n c ei n s t e a d
o fo nt h ef e a s i b l ea c t i o ns e tb e c a u s ei ti sm o r en a t u r a lt ow e a k e nt h ea s s u m p t i o n
as we will do in section 4.
3 Equilibrium under the Strong Assumption
3.1 A Simple Case
In this section, we discuss the benchmark case, i.e., two players have linear initial
utility function, u(x)=x and υ(y)=y, and they also have common discount
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, for any even number s<t ; and x0 = y0 =0 .
ci
s is the oﬀer made by player i in sth period.
Our purpose now is to characterize the SPE(s). The following straightforward
lemmas lead to the main result.
Lemma 1 Impasse is not a SPE outcome.
Both players get zero payoﬀ from impasse, while player 1 can simply oﬀer
anything larger than δ at the beginning, it will not be rejected and bring both
players positive payoﬀs.
Lemma 2 In the subgame (xt,y t)i with xt +yt ≤ 1, the highest oﬀer i will make
in a SPE is max[δ − xt,y t] for i =1 , max[δ − yt,x t] for i =2 .
Proof. We consider i =1 ,i ti st h es a m ef o ri =2 .
It is obvious that in any subgame (xt,y t)i with xt+yt > 1, impasse is the only
SPE outcome. Thus, when xt+yt > δ, it is infeasible to get an agreement in next
period, and player 2 will accept any oﬀer higher or equal to yt. Thus,it is optimal
f o rp l a y e r1t om a k eo ﬀer yt.
When xt + yt ≤ δ, a n yf e a s i b l ea g r e e m e n ti nn e x tp e r i o dh a st og i v ep l a y e r
1as h a r en ol o w e rt h a nxt/δ, by which player 2 gets the highest possible share
1 − xt/δ. In terms of discounted utility, such a share is equivalent to a current
share δ −xt. In other words, player 2 will not reject any oﬀer higher than δ −xt
in a SPE, thus, it is also the upper bound of the oﬀer player 1 will make.
Finally, xt + yt ≤ δ is just yt ≤ δ − xt.
Lemma 3 Any strategy involving acceptance of a non-highest oﬀer is not a SPE
strategy.
Proof. This is also straightforward. We only need to consider a subgame
(xt,y t)1 with xt +yt < δ,i fp l a y e r1o ﬀers c1
t,w i t hyt ≤ c1
t < δ −xt, player 2 will
reject because she can at least counteroﬀer with max[δ − c1
t/δ,x t/δ], the highest
oﬀer at t +1 th period, and get a payoﬀ higher than c1
t.
To see this, if δ−c1
t/δ ≥ xt/δ, player 2’s payoﬀ in terms of utility in tth period
is
δ(1 − (δ − c
1






if δ − c1
t/δ <x t/δ, it is δ(1 − x1
t/δ)=δ − xt >c 1
t. Thus, player 2 will reject any
oﬀer lower than δ − xt in a SPE.
9We notice that the lower bound of the oﬀer not being rejected coincides with
the upper bound of the oﬀer being rejected. We name this oﬀer as ‘clinching
oﬀer’2 with respect to the corresponding subgame. Obviously, a SPE of the
bargaining game will end with a clinching oﬀer being made and accepted. We
are now ready for the main result of this section.
Proposition 1




2 (the golden number), there is delay in SPE.
(ii) The SPE delay, measured as the number n of time periods until agreement
is reached, is a non-decreasing function of the common discount factor δ.A sδ
goes to 1, n converges to inﬁnity.
(iii) The SPE share to player 1 (who makes the ﬁrst oﬀer) is x =1− δ
n+1,
while player 2 receives the share y = δ





(iv) As δ goes to 1, δ
n (where n is a function of δ) converges to 1/2 from
above, i.e., the eﬃciency loss converges to 1/2.
Proof. (i) From the lemmas, we know any SPE ends the bargaining with
acceptance of the clinching oﬀer with respect to the state variables, thus, we
need to see when it is optimal for a player to make the clinching oﬀer.
When xt + yt > δ, it is obvious that players would make the clinching oﬀer
deﬁned as above.
When xt + yt ≤ δ, by making the clinching oﬀe r ,t h ep r o p o s e r ,s a y ,p l a y e r1
gets a current share 1−(δ−xt); if player 1 does not make the clinching oﬀer, the
best outcome for her is to get a share δ−yt/δ, the clinching oﬀer, in next period.
Then it is obvious that when xt +yt ≥ δ
2 +δ −1, for the current proposer3,i ti s
better, in terms of discounted utility, to make the clinching oﬀer (being accepted
immediately) than to wait for the clinching oﬀer in next period. Therefore when
the state variables get into this grid (See Figure 1), say, grid 1, the corresponding





2 + δ − 1 ≤ α + β ≤ 1
ª
.
Formally speaking, any subgame (xt,y t)i with (xt,y t) ∈ G1 h a su n i q u eS P E ,
in which the clinching oﬀer is made by i, and accepted by −i. Moreover, the
2Credit goes to Jeﬀ Ely for the use of this intuitive term.
3An important point here is that the condition is same for both players, which diﬀers with




Figure 1: Simple Case
equilibrium share will be (1 − δ + xt,δ − xt) when xt +yt < δ and it is player 1’s
turn (i =1 )to make an oﬀer, and vice versa.
When (xt,y t) is outside G1,t h ec u r r e n tp r o p o s e r ,s a y ,p l a y e r1 ,w i l lc o m p a r e
the following two choices: one is to make the smallest oﬀer such that (xt+1,y t+1)
will be in G1; the other is to make the basic oﬀer, yt,o ral o u s yo ﬀer, lower than yt,
and in the next period player 2 makes an oﬀer such that (xt+2,y t+2) will be in G1.
We know once a proposer realizes she is in G1, she is willing to make the clinching
oﬀer in any SPE. It is easy to see when δ(δ
2 +δ−1) ≤ xt +yt < δ
2 +δ−1, there
is no diﬀerence between the two alternatives; and when δ
4 + δ
3 − δ ≤ xt + yt <
δ(δ
2 + δ − 1), the former choice gives a higher discounted utility. Thus we can






3 − δ ≤ α + β < δ
2 + δ − 1
ª




2 + δ − 1 − xt/δ),y t
¤
and for player 2, it is still to reject any non-clinching
oﬀer. After the rejection from player 2, we will have (xt+1,y t+1)2 ∈ G1. If
xt + yt < δ(δ







The analysis will be similar for (xt,y t)2 ∈ G2.
By doing this recursively, we can ﬁnd a series of such grids with critical values
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n−2 − xt/δ),y t
i
,
and rejection of any non-clinching oﬀer by player 2, then we have (xt+1,y t+1)2 ∈
Gn−1,a n ds oo n .W h e n











. The analysis will
be similar for (xt,y t)2 ∈ Gn.
Now we can characterize the equilibrium path as following:












n−1),w h i c hm a k e sx1 =0
and y1 = δ
2n + δ
2n−1 − δ
n−1, then it follows the SPE path we have deﬁned. In
this case, it is the unique SPE path4;
( b )I fw eh a v eδ
2(n+1) + δ
2(n+1)−1 − δ
n =0 , in addition to the SPE path we
speciﬁed in (a), we have another SPE path, in which player 1’s ﬁrst oﬀer is c1
0 =0 ,
followed by the previous SPE path starting with player 2. Indiﬀerence of player
1 between the two outcomes may induce one more period of delay.
When δ
2 +δ −1 > 0, i.e., δ >
√
5−1
2 , there will be at least one period of delay.
In the case with delay, the equilibrium path is basically that the players take turn









n is the number of periods delayed in the essentially unique SPE path (the more
eﬃcient one in case of two). In other words, in the SPE, it takes n+1periods of
oﬀering and counteroﬀering to reach an agreement.
4We call it the unique SPE path instead of SPE because oﬀ equilibrium path, when a player
only need to make basic oﬀer (speciﬁed by state variables) to get into next grid in next period,
she can also make any lousy oﬀe r ,s a y ,t h eo ﬀers lower than the state variable. It has no eﬀect
on the outcome.
12Claim n is a nondecreasing function of δ.


























Since δ1 > δ2, we have a contradiction.
It is straightforward to show that number of periods delayed goes to inﬁnity
as δ goes to 1.
(iii)&(iv)
It is easy to see the equilibrium shares will be 1−δ
n+1 and δ
n+1 f o rp l a y e r1a n d
2 respectively, and the payoﬀsa r eδ
n−δ
2n+1 and δ




as δ goes to one, δ
n goes to 1
2 from above. The delay, or, the eﬃciency loss
in the current model is substantial. More speciﬁcally, when the players become
inﬁnitely patient, half of the pie will be wasted due to delay5.





















1+δ is the lower bound of player 1’s equilibrium share, and 1
1+δ is the upper bound.
Thus, there is no ﬁrst mover advantage in our model. There is not necessarily ﬁrst
mover disadvantage either. When the (0,0) is close to or on the lower boundary
of Gn,t h e r ei sﬁrst mover disadvantage; when it is close to the upper boundary,
the ﬁrst mover disadvantage gets smaller and even becomes advantage. As δ goes
to 1,b o t h δ
1+δ and 1
1+δ go to 1
2, which indicates that in the limit the equilibrium
share goes to Nash solution.
The equilibrium play we characterized is indeed a concession process. We can
treat the bargaining game as a continuous concession game. The two players
start from two extreme positions, and take turn to make concession. If the
total amounts of concessions reach 1 in ﬁnite time, there is an agreement with
corresponding delay; otherwise it is an impasse. It is not diﬃcult to see that the
step of the concession is increasing. This is intuitive, the higher is the current
oﬀer, the higher is the waiting cost from the proposer’s point of view since she has
to keep her opponent at least the same discounted utility to get an agreement.
Thus, players have incentive to improve their oﬀers by increasing steps. We
think it is also a realistic prediction. In political bargaining, we always observe
5Although the eﬃciency loss converges to 1
2 from below as δ goes to 1, it is not an increasing
function of δ due to the reason that the number of delay, n, is not strictly increasing with δ.
13two parties start from two extreme positions, and at the beginning they are very
insistent on their positions, as times goes by, they start to make small concessions,
the step of concession tends to increase over time until they meet somewhere in
the middle.
3.2 General Case
We have studied the case with homogeneous and risk neutral players. We wonder
if the main result is robust to the introduction of asymmetry and risk aversion.
Thus, we consider a general case now, in which two players have diﬀerent concave
utility functions and diﬀe r e n td i s c o u n tf a c t o r s .W ew i l lf o l l o wt h es a m el o g i ca si n
the benchmark model. Given any subgame (xt,y t)i , we ﬁrst specify the clinching
oﬀer in the following lemma. Same as in the simple case, clinching oﬀer is the
lower bound of the oﬀers, which the opponent cannot reject in a SPE; and it
is also the upper bound of the oﬀers, which the opponent always rejects in a
SPE. Any SPE path ends the bargaining with a clinching oﬀer being made and
accepted.
Lemma 4 For any subgame (xt,y t)i , with u−1(u(xt)/δ1)+υ−1(υ(yt)/δ2) ≤ 16,
the clinching oﬀer is:
υ
−1(δ2υ(1 − u
−1(u(xt)/δ1))),i fi =1 ;
u
−1(δ1u(1 − υ
−1(υ(yt)/δ2))),i fi =2 .
For tractability, we focus on the family of concave power functions, i.e.,
u(x)=x
λ1 and υ(y)=y
λ2, λ1, λ2 ∈ (0,1].











The discount factors remain as δ1, δ2 ∈ (0,1). N o ww ep i nd o w nt h ec o n d i -
tions on the state variables under which the players will make the clinching of-
fer. For player 1, making the clinching oﬀer means payoﬀ is u(1 − υ−1(δ2υ(1 −





2)). Comparing the payoﬀs, we can deﬁne the grid 1 for player
1, i.e., G1
1.
6This condition means that without making any further concession in the current period,











































For player 2, making the clinching oﬀer means payoﬀ is υ(1 − u−1(δ1u(1 −


















































This is the main diﬀerence between the current case and the benchmark case,
G1
1 does not coincide with G2
1. Nevertheless, there is still an inclusion relation
between G1
1 and G2
1, which depends on A1
1 ≷ A2
1. Without loss of generality, we
assume A1
1 >A 2
1,t h e nG1
1 ⊂ G2
1. For any subgame (xt,y t)i , with (u(xt),υ(yt)) ∈
G1
1, the SPE path will start with that player i makes the clinching oﬀer, which
will be accepted by player −i.F o r(xt,y t)i , with (u(xt),υ(yt)) ∈ G2
1\G1
1,i fi =2 ,
it is still that player 2 makes the clinching oﬀer, and player 1 accepts; if i =1 ,
player 1 will choose to wait, i.e., making an oﬀer equal to yt or less, and player
2 will reject and make the clinching oﬀer in the following period. Similar to




































































































Figure 2: General Case
The inequality between A1
n and A2
n, thus, the inclusion relation between G1
n
and G2
n, will not change with n.T h i si sg i v e ni nt h ef o l l o w i n gL e m m a .
Lemma 5 A1
n > A2








Given the inclusion relation of G1
n and G2
n, we can specify the SPE path




n,p l a y e ri will make the oﬀer such that (u(xt+1),υ(yt+1)) is
on the lower boundary of G2
n−1,player −i will reject the oﬀer unless n =1 .I f
(u(xt),υ(yt)) ∈ G2
n\G1
n,a n di =2 ,i ti ss a m et ot h ea b o v e ;i fi =1 ,p l a y e r
1 will now choose to wait, i.e., making an oﬀer no larger than yt, and it will
become the same as above from next period. Finally we can ﬁnd some n such
that (0,0) ∈ Gi
n+1, and deﬁne the essentially unique SPE path for the whole




have two SPE paths with player 1’s choice of waiting or not at the beginning of
the game.
Another important feature (See Figure 2) is that for each n,t h el o w e rb o u n d -
aries of G1
n and G2
n are parallel, but they are not parallel to the boundary of the
set of feasible utility pairs. The leaning of the lower boundaries will keep to the







16From Figure 2, we can see that the direction of the leaning is in favor of the
player with the larger δ
1
λi
i in terms of the ﬁnal share in the SPE. The inclusion
relation between G1
n and G2




i as the measure of ’bargaining power’. It is increasing with respect to both δi
and λi.
The results for the general case are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2
(i) There is an essentially unique SPE path, the SPE strategies are speciﬁed
as above given the location of (x0,y 0) or (0,0);
(ii) Either δ1 or δ2 goes to 1, the number of periods delayed goes to inﬁnity;
(iii) If G1
n+1 ⊆ G2
n+1, when (0,0) ∈ G1







2 ) with n periods of delay; when (0,0) ∈ G2
n+1\G1




1 ,1 − δ
n+1
λ1
1 ) with n +1periods of delay.I fG2
n+1 ⊆ G1
n+1 and (0,0) ∈ G1
n+1,






2 ) with n periods of delay.
4 Results under Weaker Assumption
In this section, we explore the possibility of obtaining similar results under weaker
assumption. Under the interpretation of loss aversion, we are interested in the
eﬀects on the SPE path of weakening the assumption from the extremely loss
aversion to some moderate level of loss aversion. For the sake of simplicity, we
work with linear utility function and common discount factor.
Given the state variables (xt,y t), the (current) utility functions from the share
of the pie are:
Player 1: e ut(x)=
(
x
xt + β(x − xt)
if x ≥ xt,
if x < xt;
Player 2: e vt(y)=
(
y
yt + β(y − yt)
if y ≥ yt,
if y < yt.
When β =1 , it is the standard setting in Rubinstein(1982); when β goes to
inﬁnity, it goes to the case with strong assumption as we discussed in section
3. We are now interested in the case with 1 < β < ∞. Basically, what we
are doing here is to replace the discontinuity of the utility function under the
strong assumption by a kink. Reducing the sharpness of the kink is equivalent
to weakening the assumption, or reducing the extent of the loss aversion. Our
next Proposition says when β is large enough, we can still have essentially unique
17SPE path with considerable delay, which is similar to the case under the strong
assumption.
Proposition 3
When β ≥ 1
1−δ,there is an essentially unique SPE path with considerable delay.
T h ee q u i l i b r i u ms h a r ea n dt h en u m b e ro fp e r i o d sd e l a y e di ss a m et ot h ec a s eu n d e r
the strong assumption for the same δ.




Given the current utility functions with loss aversion, impasse is the only SPE
in a subgame (xt,y t)i with
β−1
β (xt + yt) > 1. For subgame (xt,y t)i with
β−1
β (xt +






Consider a possible clinching oﬀer (A(xt)−xt) for player 1 in (xt,y t)1 , where
δ ≤ A(xt) < 1.
If
βδ
β−1 <A (xt) < 1:






δ > 1. (Impasse if
rejected)
If δ ≤ A(xt) ≤
βδ
β−1 :




δ (zero payoﬀ)i nn e x tp e r i o d ,w h i c hw i l l
not be rejected by player 1 since there will be impasse in following period. Player




δ . Choose minimum A(xt) such that y∗ ≤
[A(xt)−xt]
δ , we
get A(xt) ≥ δ + xt/β.












In any (xt,y t)1 , once the oﬀer A(xt) − xt is made by player 1, player 2 will
accept immediately. On the other hand, any oﬀer lower will be rejected because
a similar counteroﬀer by player 2 in next period will not be rejected by player 1,
and the payoﬀ will be better for player 2. Similar clinching oﬀer can be deﬁned
f o rp l a y e r2 .
When will a player make the clinching oﬀer?
Given (xt,y t)i :
1 − [A(xt) − xt] ≥ δ[A(yt/δ) − yt/δ],fori=1 ,
1 − [A(yt) − yt] ≥ δ[A(xt/δ) − xt/δ],fori=2 .
18We get the following condition:




2 + δ − 1).
After this, it will be same to the case under strong assumption. A family of















Therefore, we get essentially unique SPE path again.
It is easy to check the equilibrium share and the number of periods delayed
are the same as before.
It is natural to ask the following questions now: (1) Will there be delay on
SPE path when β is small? (2) Will the SPE path converge to Rubinstein’s
result when β goes to 1? We do not have clean results on these questions. Our
conjecture is that at least for not very large β,a n df o rs o m eδ, there is still delay
in the bargaining game parameterized by (β,δ).
5D i s c u s s i o n
One interesting observation is that the equilibrium play we obtain has a ﬂavor
of forward induction. When a player strongly believes that her opponent is a
Bayesian maximizer, she has a reason to believe that her opponent is looking
f o r w a r dt oab e t t e rp a y o ﬀ after observing a rejection, therefore, it is also likely
t h a ts h eb e l i e v e st h a ts h eh a st oi m p r o v et h eo ﬀer in order to reach an agreement.
However, this is not exactly the forward induction as stated in Van Damme
(1989). In his informal deﬁnition, if a player chooses between an outside option
and a subgame with a unique and viable equilibrium, which is strictly better
than the outside option, the equilibrium with players’ playing the subgame is
the only self-enforcing one. The SPE in Rubinstein’s model satisﬁes this forward
induction requirement, and an important reason is that the bargaining game in his
model is isomorphic at every decision node where an oﬀer is made. The reason
that uniqueness is needed is that there maybe a coordination problem in the
subgame. Our bargaining model is a perfect information game, this should not
be a problem. The viability concerns the situation, in which there maybe further
19moves by both players in the subgame after the deviation from the outside option.
In the bargaining game with inﬁnite alternating-oﬀers procedure, if we want to
justify the deviation, i.e., the rejection of the SPE oﬀer in Rubinstein’s model, as
a signal about future play, the viability requirement cannot be satisﬁed. Another
problem is that there exists an outcome in the subgame, which is indiﬀerent
with the current oﬀer for the player who has to decide to accept or not. To
incorporate the forward induction analysis into bargaining model is not new.
Dekel (1990) discussed the power of forward induction and stability in a two-
period simultaneous bargaining game. We want to understand how the idea of
f o r w a r di n d u c t i o nc o u l dw o r ki na ni n ﬁnite horizon game such as the bargaining
game with alternating-oﬀers procedure.
One closely related issue is about the common belief of rationality in extensive
games. It is well known that we have counterintuitive SPEs in many cases, for
example, the chain-store paradox in Selten (1978) and the centipede game in
Rosenthal (1981). Kreps et al. (1982) obtain considerable cooperations in a
ﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game by adding a small dose of “Tit-for-
Tat” players. An exogenous lack of common belief of rationality results in a
rational play which is inconsistent with the SPE. Reny (1992) argued that even
there is common belief of rationality at the beginning of the game, it might
still be possible to have a rational play inconsistent with the SPE. The lack of
common belief of rationality may arise endogenously. In a perfect information
game, the concept of SPE depends on the assumption of common knowledge of
rationality, or, common belief of rationality at every information set. Reny (1992)
showed that in the games with paradoxical SPEs, such as the “Take it or leave
it” game, once a player deviates from the SPE path, it is impossible to retain
common belief of rationality. Reny (1993) showed that in most two-player games
with perfect information, it is impossible to have common belief of rationality
everywhere. This challenged the salience of the concept of SPE and the theory
of rationalizability in extensive form games developed by Bernheim (1984) and
Pearce (1984) as well.
We think it is also reasonable to include the bargaining game into this family
of extensive form games with counterintuitive SPEs. The unique SPE in Ru-
binstein’s bargaining game also depends on the common belief of rationality at
every decision node. This point can be made clear by looking at the concept
of iterated conditional dominance and its application on Rubinstein’s bargaining
game introduced in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). By iterative elimination of
conditional dominated actions, the unique SPE can be obtained in Rubinstein’s
20bargaining game. If we state the belief about rationality explicitly, the logic will
be like this: player 1 believes player 2 is rational, thus she will not make an oﬀer
higher than δ; player 1 believes that player 2 believes player 1 is rational, thus
s h ew i l ln o tm a k ea no ﬀer lower than δ(1 − δ); etc. This logic goes as an inﬁnite
sequence, the unique SPE will be the convergent point, which corresponds to the
argument, player 1 believes player 2 believes player 1...is rational,w i t hi n ﬁnite
length. Since the common belief of rationality gives the unique prediction of the
play, the SPE path, the deviation from it will be the violation of the common
belief of rationality, it will not hold any more. Once there is no common belief
of rationality, it will be an important issue that how the players update their
belief, belief about belief, etc., then given a speciﬁc belief updating rule, it may
be rational to choose a play inconsistent with the SPE at the ﬁrst place7.I tw i l l
be of our interest for further study to formally model the idea included in this
discussion. Our inclination now is that the relation between the Abreu and Gul
(2000) and this possible line of research on bargaining will be parallel to that
between Kreps et al. (1982) and the sequel papers by Reny (1992a, 1992b and
1993).
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we provide an explanation for the delay in real life bargaining as
an alternative of the usual incomplete information approach. Our point of view
is that in many real life bargaining situation, information asymmetry may not
be the main underlying force for the delay, endogenous preferences or strategic
commitment eﬀects should be taken into consideration. Our preference assump-
tion will be taken as incredible threat in classic analysis, and we try to provide
a rationale for such kind of preference to make the incredible threat credible.
We think both delegated bargaining with justiﬁcation and preference with loss
aversion have some explaining power.
The equilibrium play we obtain has some appealing features, especially, it
has a ﬂavor of forward induction. We also want to explore the possibility of
providing epistemic foundation for such a play without relying on the preference
assumption. This will involve the issues about rationality, belief system, and
belief updating. The pioneering work on these topics focused on ﬁnite extensive
form games, while as the bargaining game has two dimensional inﬁnity, inﬁnite
7In Rubinstein’s model, there is no such updating, the common belief of rationality retains
after any history, we take it as an extreme case of the belief updating.
21horizon and inﬁnite actions at each decision node for an oﬀer to be made. This
imposes the great diﬃculty on analysis. However, it will be important to extend
the analysis to inﬁnite horizon games, for example, the forward induction reason-
ing in Rubinstein’s bargaining game or inﬁnitely repeated games. We leave it for
further investigation.
22APPENDIX
P r o o fo fL e m m a4
Let θ1 = δ
1
λ1
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2 ≥ 0 by (1);






2 < 0 by (2).
Thus, A1
n > A2
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